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THE BELATED DECLINE OF LITERALISM IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE:
SOFT DECEPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
William H. Simon*
Literalism is the doctrine that a facially accurate but knowingly
deceptive statement does not violate prohibitions of falsehood and
misrepresentation. This essay argues that Literalism has had greater
legitimacy in professional responsibility than in other areas of law, but
that it seems to be in terminal decline. It surveys the arguments for
and against Literalism and concludes that its impending demise should
be welcomed.
I. LITERALISM V. CONTEXTUALISM
o In the course of a divorce trial, the husband testifies that he
acquired certain property as trustee for his mother:
Judge: [to Husband on the stand]: Where is your mother... ?
Husband: In Salem.1
Husband's lawyer knows that the statement is true only in the sense
that the mother is buried in Salem. If the judge or Wife's counsel
understood that the mother had died, further questions would bring
out that the Husband had inherited the property, which would be
highly material to the Wife's claims for support and property division.
Husband's counsel, however, takes no action with respect to his
client's response.'
o Banking regulators ask a Savings and Loan Association to produce
underwriting files for specified loans. With the knowledge of counsel,
bank officers produce files which have been labeled with the names of
the loans but to which some documents have been added and others
removed since the time of the loan commitment. This is inconsistent
* Stephen and Barbara Friedman Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia University.
For Deborah Rhode. Thanks for comments to Alan Hyde and participants in
discussions at Fordham and Columbia.
1. In re A, 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).
I Id
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with customary record-keeping practice. Counsel does not mention
the alterations to the regulators.3
* A wrongful death action is brought against a drug company by the
survivors of an asthmatic child. The child died after taking, in the
course of a viral infection, a drug made by the defendant. The
company denies that it had sufficient knowledge of danger from the
drug to have had any duty to warn the child's physician. The trade
name of the drug is Somophyllin Oral Liquid; its active ingredient is
theophyllin. In discovery, plaintiff demands production of "[a]ll
documents pertaining to any warning letters ... regarding the use of
the drug Somophyllin Oral Liquid."4 Defendant's counsel responds
that there were no such letters, even though they are aware of a letter
referring to "life threatening toxicity when pediatric asthmatics [on
theophyllin] contract viral infections." The letter, however, made no
mention of the trade name Somophyllin Oral Liquid.5
Each of these cases led to professional responsibility charges, and in
each, counsel relied on Literalistic interpretations of his duties.
Under a Literalistic approach, an actor's response is adequate as long
as it is not misleading under any of the meanings that can be non-
frivolously attributed to it. The range of eligible meanings includes
those that are independent of the context of the response and thus
rely mainly on the surface or dictionary meaning of the words. The
first lawyer is thus free to rely on an interpretation of the judge's
questions as concerned only with the mother's physical whereabouts;
the second is free to treat the bank examiner's request as asking for
the documents that happen to be in the files at the moment; and the
third can respond as if the plaintiff was asking only for information
pertaining to theophyllin drugs with a particular trade name.
Literalism is a response to "asymmetric ambiguity." The
professional responsibility issues with which it is concerned most often
involve someone asking for information (the "asker") and someone
responding to a request or demand for it (the "responder"). The
responder is making a statement that she is aware has more than one
non-frivolous interpretation. The asker may have introduced the
ambiguity through an imprecision in her request or question. It is
likely that the asker is unaware of the ambiguity precisely because she
has less information about the subject than the responder. Moreover,
3. In re Fishbein, OTS AP 92-19, 74-93 (1992) (reporting allegations of Office
of Thrift Supervision), reprinted in Practising Law Institute, The Attorney-Client
Relationship After Kaye, Scholer 237, 257-62, 272-85 (1992). The allegations
mentioned above represent one of seven charges of deceptive conduct, all disputed by
the lawyers.
4. Wash. St. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1081
(Wash. 1993).
5. Id. at 1075.
1882 [Vol. 70
2002] SOFTDECEPTIONAND THE RULE OF LAW
in the situation with which we are concerned, the ambiguity arises
from a divergence between a literal and a contextual meaning. The
distinction is a matter of degree. All meanings are contextual, but a
literal interpretation disregards all but a minimal range of context. A
contextual interpretation takes in the entire range of factors that can
be conveniently taken account of.
In situations of asysmmetric ambiguity, Literalism stands for two
points. First, it puts the costs of ambiguity and the burden of
clarification on the asker. Second, it accords as much respect to literal
or surface interpretations as to substantive or contextual ones. The
responder is as free to rely on the former as on the latter.'
An alternative to the Literalist response to asymmetric ambiguity
might be called contextual, purposive, or substantive. An example of
a substantive approach is the fraud standard of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which includes this:
A representation that the maker knows to be capable of two
interpretations, one of which he knows to be false and the other true
is fraudulent if it is made:
(a) with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is
false, or
(b) without any belief or expectation as to how it will be understood,
or
(c) with reckless indifference as to how it will be understood.7
The touchstone here is the addressee's understanding, which makes
context relevant. Note also that the speaker who is aware of
ambiguity-the responder in our case-has a very high burden of
clarification. Not only is he not free to rely on interpretations that he
knows the addressee will not assume, but he cannot rely even on
interpretations that it appears the addressee might not assume. If
there is ambiguity, he must clarify it if he speaks.
Under a Contextual approach such as the Restatement's, the three
scenarios are easy cases. Counsel in the divorce case knows that the
judge is likely to understand "in Salem" to mean that the mother is
living in Salem. Counsel in the bank examination is at least recklessly
indifferent to the prospect that the examiners will interpret their
response to mean that the documents in the files were there at the
time of the loan decision and that the files contain all the documents
6. E.g., David E. Kendall et al., Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral
of Office of Independent Counsel, H.R. Doc. No. 105-317, at 26 (1998) [hereinafter
Kendall et al., Preliminary Memorandum] ("If answers are truthful or literally truthful
but misleading, there is no perjury as a matter of law, no matter how misleading the
testimony is or is intended to be. The law simply does not require the witness to aid
his interrogator.").
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 527 (1977).
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on which the decisions were based. Defense counsel in the drug case
knows that plaintiff's counsel intends its request to include drugs that
are medically equivalent to the one in issue regardless of trade name
and hence knows that its response will be understood to mean that
there are no documents with respect to any such drugs.8
The remainder of this essay suggests that Literalism has remained
far more influential in professional responsibility than it has in other
fields, but that its influence seems to be declining. It then rehearses
the arguments for and against Literalism and tries to substantiate the
widely-shared intuition that it is pernicious.
II. LITERALISM OUTSIDE AND INSIDE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A. Outside
Outside professional responsibility, a powerful tendency in
American legal thought has been to move away from Literalism
toward Contextualism. Hostility to Literalism is prominent in the
work of all the most highly-regarded modem legal theorists from
Cardozo to Dworkin. In private law doctrine, Contextualism had
triumphed by the mid-twentieth century. I have already quoted the
Contextual standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts on fraud.'
Similarly, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Uniform Commercial Code mandate Contextual interpretation of
contract terms. 0
The Restatement (Second) of Contract's provisions on deception
and mistake repudiate Literalism in precisely the kind of situation we
are concerned with. "Half truths," as well as explicit falsehoods, can
warrant recission.1' When one contracting party has "reason to know"
that the second party attaches a different meaning to a term than she
and the second is unaware of the divergence, the second party's
meaning controls." Where one party "has reason to know" that the
8. Of course, in a Literalistic regime, the asker will try to make her questions
unambiguous and will be attentive to Literalistic interpretations. To the extent that
these efforts are successful, the main difference from the asker's point of view
between a Literalistic and a Contextual regime is that she has to work harder under
the latter. However, it seems likely that such efforts will have only limited success
and that askers will inadvertently assume mistaken interpretations under Literalism.
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 153(b), 159, 201 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-
201(3) (2001) ("agreement" found, as well as "in... language," also "by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance").
11. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159, cmt. b, illus. 4 (seller of apartment
house who represents that apartments rent for $200 without also disclosing that these
rents are illegal under the rent control law makes actionable misrepresentation).
12. Id. § 201(2).
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second's manifest agreement is premised on a material mistake of the
second party, the contract is not binding on the second party. 3 For
example, if a prospective sub-contractor has submitted a bid that is
based on an arithmetical miscalculation reasonably observable by the
general contractor, the sub-contractor is not bound. 4
In civil procedure, the Federal Rules reject Literalism at several
points. For example: "Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. 15 "[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer,
or response [in discovery] is to be treated as a failure to disclose,
answer, or respond."' 6
Literalism seems to have a stronger presence in criminal law. At
most, however, it is a one-way role. Some authority allows the
defendant to appeal to Literalism where a statute is clumsily drafted
or the government pleads inadequately or the prosecutor asks an
ambiguous question on cross-examination. On the other hand, the
government's obligations to the defendant are defined and interpreted
contextually. The government's Brady obligation to turn over
exculpatory evidence, for example, does not require a specific,
unambiguous demand by the defendant. The government must make
its own judgment about materiality, on a contextual understanding,
and then volunteer the information. 7
Moreover, even pro-defendant Literalism has eroded in the
criminal sphere. Cases in the perjury area, for example, are divided.
13. Id. § 153 (b).
14. Id. § 153(b), cmt. e, illus. 9.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
16. Id. R. 37(a)(3).
17. On Brady duties, see Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure 1098-1107
(3d ed. 2000).
A notorious prosecutorial reliance on Literalism occurred in the examination
of Captain Proctor, the ballistics expert in the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti:
Q: Have you an opinion as to whether bullet No. 3... was fired from the
Colt automatic, which is in evidence [Sacco's pistol]?
A: I have.
Q: And what is your opinion?
A: My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired from that pistol.
After the conviction, Proctor conceded to the defense that "[alt no time was I able to
find any evidence whatever which tended to convince me that the particular model
bullet found in Berardelli's body... came from Sacco's pistol" and that the
prosecutor had framed the question in order to avoid eliciting a negative answer.
Neither the trial court nor the appeals court found any problem with the prosecutor's
conduct. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A Critical Analysis for
Lawyers and Laymen 77-78, 81-82, 88-89 (1927).
I doubt, however, that anyone would defend the expert's testimony today.
See, for example, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957), in which the Court, per
Justice Frankfurter, found a due process violation in the prosecutor's knowing
elicitation of testimony which, "taken as a whole [conveyed a] false impression." (In
Alcorta, the witness denied that he was "in love" with the victim or had had "dates"
with her, which he and the prosecutor apparently believed to be literally true, while
both knew that the witness had had sexual intercourse with her on several occasions.
Id. at 30.)
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In the Bronston case, much invoked by President Clinton's lawyers in
the Lewinsky affair, the Supreme Court reversed a perjury conviction
based on the following exchange:
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you ever?
A: The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich.8
The answer was misleading; the examiner interpreted it to mean
that the witness had not had a personal account, and in fact he had.
But the Court held it noncriminal; insofar as it referred explicitly only
to the corporation, it was literally true.
However, in other cases involving misleadingly ambiguous answers,
convictions have been upheld. For example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a
conviction based on a series of exchanges such as this:
Q: Didn't you meet with a lady at a hotel here in New Orleans on
several occasions when you came down?
A: No. I did not.19
The answer was true under the "literal" interpretation of "New
Orleans" as within the legal boundaries of the city, since the meeting
took place in the adjacent suburb of Kenner, but the answer was false
under the interpretation of "New Orleans" meaning the New Orleans
metropolitan area, which context indicated was the one intended by
the examiner.2 0
Aside from perjury, criminal offenses for deception rarely require
literal falsity. Criminal fraud doctrine, like civil fraud, has evolved
away from Literalism.2' And, as Stuart Green concludes, with the
18. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973).
19. United States v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847,850 (5th Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 851; see also United States v. DeZam, 157 F.3d 1042, 1049 (6th Cir.
1998) (in perjury case falsity is measured in terms of the "context of the
questioning"). These cases distinguish Bronston by the fact that there the answer was
unresponsive on its face. The referee asked about individual bank accounts, and the
witness responded in terms of corporate bank accounts. Had the referee been
attentive, she would have followed up by insisting on a specific answer about
individual accounts. (Of course, one could say in Fulbright and DeZarn that, had the
prosecutor been attentive, she would have made her initial question less ambiguous.)
One litigation situation where Contextualism has long been uncontroversial is
the common practice of asking questions on cross-examination in the form: "Isn't it
true that x?" The answer "yes" is invariably interpreted to mean that x is true,
notwithstanding that the literal meaning is the opposite. Lawyers would never think
of trying to get some advantage by appealing to this literal meaning. Contextual
interpretation is so entrenched here that lawyers are no longer aware of the literal
interpretation.
21. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 829-33 (3d ed. 2000).
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newer, more specialized statutory offenses, such as mail or securities
fraud, "literal falsity is seldom, if ever, required.""
The popular attitude toward Literalism seems to have remained the
one depicted by Shakespeare in The Merchant of Venice. Literalism,
as exemplified by Shylock's insistence on holding Antonio to his
promise of a pound of flesh, is presumptively deplored. It is
defensible and admirable only when used as a last resort to thwart
some substantive injustice, as with Portia's counter-move based on a
Literalistic interpretation of "flesh" to mean only skin and not blood. 3
Thus, the Literalistic defenses of President Clinton against the
perjury charges appear to have been met largely with contempt.
Clinton's lawyers argued that the answer that Clinton had not had sex
with Monica Lewinsky was true under the lengthy written definition
of "sex" the Jones lawyers had filed. Clinton also argued that his
ordinary-language understanding of "sex" did not include oral sex.
These arguments did not seem to persuade many.!4 People tended to
scoff or (if they were sympathetic on other grounds) wink at them.
Clinton's congressional defenders did not rely on these points.
Even within a Literalistic perspective, Clinton's arguments were
debatable. A careful reading of the plaintiff's definition does not
support Clinton's interpretation, but the verbiage is dense, and it is
22. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsey Denying: How Moral Concepts
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 Hastings L.J. 157, 188
(2001).
23. Shylock proposes the bond "in a merry sport," William Shakespeare, The
Merchant of Venice, act I, sc. 3, then when Antonio defaults, insists on literal
enforcement. Portia responds that "the words expressly" give him rights only to flesh,
not blood. Id. act IV, sc. 1.
24. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (dismissing
Clinton's arguments based on "tortured definitions and interpretations of the term
'sexual relations'); Robert Novak, Triumph of the Hair-Splitters, N.Y. Post, Jan. 25,
1999, at 27 (reporting popular disdain for President's "legalistic" arguments); Patrick
Oster, Kill the Lawyers?, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 21,1998, at A20 (same).
There were two main arguments about discovery answers. First, Clinton
denied that he had had "sexual relations" with any federal employee in response to an
interrogatory that did not define the term. His defense was that "sexual relations"
requires "intercourse" and does not include oral sex. Kendall et al, Preliminary
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 7.
Second, during the deposition he was asked the same question after being
given a definition that stipulated that "a person engages in 'sexual relations' when the
person knowingly engages in or causes... contact with the genitalia, anus, groin,
breasts, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person." Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth IV. Starr in
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code; Section 595(c), H.R.
Doc. No. 105-310, at 133 (1998) [hereinafter Starr Report]. In effect, Clinton's
defenders argued that the definition applies only where a person causes contact with a
specified body part of another person and only for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of the other person. As Judge Wright characterized
Clinton's position: "It appears the President is asserting that Ms. Lewinsky could be
having sex with him while, at the same time, he was not having sex with her." Jones,
36 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 n.16.
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quite plausible that someone relying only on this language could have
been confused. Judge Wright expressed concern at the time of the
deposition that the definition was hard to follow and that the
President might not understand it.5 Ordinary-language usage of
"sex" seems to vary with respect to whether it includes oral sex;
Lewinsky used the word at least once on the Tripp tapes in a way that
excluded oral sex. 6
If the questions are viewed in the broader context of the Jones
litigation, however, there can be no question that the Jones lawyers
meant their questions to cover fellatio. The Jones lawyers were
looking for conduct that resembled what Jones alleged occurred with
her in the Arkansas hotel room. The conduct Jones alleged looks
more than anything like a request for fellatio. So if the standard is
Contextual, Clinton's defense is preposterous. Its general dismissal in
popular discussion tends to confirm that popular morality applies a
Contextual standard.
B. In Professional Responsibility
Literalism has never been rejected in professional responsibility as
decisively as in general doctrine and popular morality. True, it has
often been criticized by individual lawyers. Judge Marvin Frankel's
1975 article The Search for Truth is a widely noted example .2  But
lawyers as a group have not come close to renunciation of it.
Literalism has remained a respected, though contested, mainstream
position.
The vitality of Literalism is most readily observed in the criminal
sphere. Here, respectable opinion defends even some forms of active
deception, and no doubt such views would accept the more passive
form involved in Literalism. In the civil sphere, there is little
discussion or authority squarely addressing the choice between
Literalism and Contextualism. Nevertheless, the cases with which we
began suggest that the influence of Literalism, though waning, is far
from exhausted. Lawyers were sanctioned in all three cases.28 But
two of them-Kaye Scholer,29 the bank case; and Fisons,° the drug
25. Deposition of William Jefferson Clinton, Jan. 17, 1998, Jones v. Clinton, C.A.
No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/
03/13/jones.v.clinton.docs/clinton/oo.jpg.
26. Supplemental Materials to Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W.
Starr in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, Section
595(c), H.R. Doc. No. 105-316, at 2664 (1998).
27. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1031 (1975).
28. In the banking case, the lawyers agreed to pay a fine to settle the case prior to
adjudication of the merits.
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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case-were highly controversial within the bar and, to some extent,
continue to be.
The Kaye Scholer lawyers responded to the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS") charges of deception, including the one
concerning document production described above, by appealing to
Literalism. With the support of Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the
ABA Model Rules, they argued that the standard for judging their
behavior was Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.1 on
"Meritorious Claims and Contentions," which requires only that a
statement have a "basis... that is not frivolous."'" As applied to
argument or the assertion of legal conclusions on the basis of matters
of record in an adjudicatory proceeding, the non-frivolous standard is
uncontroversial. The danger of misleading ambiguity in this area is
small, since the basis for the statements is in view of everyone. But
Hazard's assertion that the non-frivolous standard of Rule 3.1 applied
to factual statements in informal dealings amounted to a radical
assertion of Literalism in situations where the potential for misleading
ambiguity is pervasive. He suggested that it did not matter whether
the Kaye Scholer lawyers knew their responses were misleadingly
incomplete or intended that they be so, so long as there was some
interpretation under which the statements were non-frivolous.
A chorus of bar leaders and institutions offered vigorous support
for Kaye Scholer after the OTS charges. It is difficult, however, to
distinguish the extent to which the support was premised on
acceptance of the firm's Literalist position on the misrepresentation
charges. Much of the support was focused on an unusually aggressive
remedy OTS employed at the outset of the case-a "freeze" of the
firm's assets under the banking laws. And when Kaye Scholer's
supporters discussed the merits they often portrayed the charges
inaccurately (for example, as complaining of nondisclosure rather
than misleading disclosure) and, therefore, responded confusingly.
Nevertheless, none of the supporters made any effort to distance
themselves from Kaye Scholer's Literalist arguments. - Particularly
notable in this respect was Judge Frankel, perhaps the most famous
critic of Literalism, who endorsed Kaye Scholer's position without
qualification in an op-ed piece.33
31. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Sununary of Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
reprinted in Practising Law Institute, supra note 3, at 381. Hazard ignored what would
seem to be the more directly pertinent prohibitions against making "a false statement
of material fact" of Model Rules 3.3 and 4.1. No doubt he found it hard to argue that
"misrepresentation" should be given a Literalist reading here when tort authority so
strongly supports a Contextualist one.
32. The response to the Kaye Scholer charges is described in William H. Simon,
The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of
Evasion and Apology, 23 Law & Soc. Inquiry 243, 259-82 (1998).
33. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers Can't Be Stool Pigeons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1992, at A25. Judge Frankel seems to have misunderstood the charges, see Simon,
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Fisons was less discussed than Kaye Scholer, but the proceedings
did produce some indication of lawyer support for Literalism. Unlike
Kaye Scholer, in which OTS's misconduct claim was based
substantially on professional responsibility norms, the plaintiff's
charges in Fisons alleged only a violation of the discovery provisions
of the civil procedure rules. However, the defense lawyers invoked
professional responsibility norms in their response. They argued that
the civil procedure rules should not be interpreted to impose
requirements inconsistent with professional responsibility norms and
that professional responsibility norms either forbade or did not
require turning over even clearly material and important documents
in response to an ambiguous request. They were able to support this
claim with opinions from no less than fourteen ethics experts,
including two former presidents of the Washington State bar and
(again) Geoffrey Hazard. In denying sanctions, the trial judge found
withholding the document "was consistent with the customary and
accepted litigation practices of the bar of Snohomish County and of
this state."'  In overruling, the Washington Supreme Court did not
dispute this finding; it just treated it as irrelevant. In effect, it
indicated that it wanted the customary practices to change.
Literalism thus appears to retain substantial support within the bar.
On the other hand, our three cases, and some others,35 raise the
question whether the position is eroding. Cases like In re A ("Where
is your mother?") that preclude Literalist deception in responses to a
judge seem not to have provoked protest.36 Although Fisons
provoked a strong Literalist defense in the lower court, the state
supreme court's repudiation of Literalism in the discovery context,
though widely noted, has met with little open criticism. OTS's
challenge in the banking context was technically a stand-off; it was
never decided on the merits. But the massive defense of Kaye Scholer
focused mainly on issues other than the ones involving Literalism, and
some professional responsibility textbooks now report the charges
with some sympathy.
supra note 32, at 261-62, and it's not clear he intended to endorse the Literalist
aspects of Kaye Scholer's defense.
34. Wash. .. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1078
(Wash. 1993) (Washington Supreme Court opinion reporting trial court disposition);
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, Am. Law., Apr. 1994, at 5 (describing Fison's
expert supporters).
35. E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1964) (upholding
criminal convictions of lawyer and accountant under the securities laws for various
implicit misrepresentations, such as "[tihe statements that certain assets had not been
'verified by direct communication' implied that with this qualification all assets had
been verified by suitable means [even though] they had not been").
36. See also Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962) (approving vacation
of judicial approval of settlement on behalf of minor where opposing counsel failed to
volunteer material information to court).
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C. Behind or Ahead of the Times?
It remains to be seen whether this picture of professional
responsibility as a jurisprudential laggard should be revised as a
consequence of the renewed defense of "formalism" and "textualism"
in public and commercial law. Textualism has acquired new prestige
in recent years, and Formalism has been defended explicitly for the
first time in many decades.
Whether professional responsibility Literalists can take heart from
this development is not clear. In many respects, the arguments
advanced in favor of Formalism and Textualism seem irrelevant to
our issues.
Many of the new Textualists or Formalists disclaim Literalism and
insist on their openness to a significant range of Contextual
interpretations.37 Moreover, many of them value text or form as
evidence of either the intention of the law-maker or the probable
understanding of the addressee. By contrast, our Literalists are
indifferent to both the responder's intention and the asker's
understanding. Finally, Textualists and Formalists often believe that
there is a single best interpretation of the statement in question, and
their prescriptions are designed to identify it. Literalists, on the other
hand, insist that within a broad range one understanding is as good as
another. (Indeed, the term Literalism is somewhat misleading, since
Literalists are happy to permit the responder to rely on Contextual
interpretation when it is to his advantage to do so.) While Textualists
and Formalists tend to have a strict or essentialist attitude toward
interpretation, the Literalist attitude is anarchic.
Moreover, the circumstances to which the new arguments have
been applied seem different from ours. Much of the Formalist and
Textualist argument has been focused on public law situations where
the state confronts private citizens directly, while Literalism is most
often concerned with private law situations where private citizens are
disputing with each other. Defenses of Formalism in the commercial
sphere are typically focused on situations of repeat dealings among
members of a common trade, where problems of asymmetric
information are not frequent."
Nevertheless, there is some kinship between the new Formalist-
Textualist arguments and the Literalist position in professional
responsibility. Textualists and Formalists often proceed from a
libertarian orientation; they value their methods as ways to constrain
37. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997) (-good textualist" is
not a Literalist); John F. Manning, Textualisin as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 673, 696 (1997) ("Textualism is not literalism.").
38. See, e.g., Robert Scott, The Case for Formnalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 847, 874 (2000) ("Nothing in the case for formalism would preclude
judicial policing of firms seeking to use literal language as a vehicle to exploit
consumers or other 'occasional' contractors.").
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state power. Although these concerns are less salient in the private
sphere, the Contextualist position does require more judicial
intervention to protect the victims of asymmetric ambiguity than the
Literalist one. A strong distrust of state actors would thus weigh
against Contextualism. There is, in addition, an affinity between the
argument made by John Manning that Textualism functions to induce
the legislature to clarify its statutes39 and the Literalist position that
seeks to encourage the asker to reduce the ambiguity of her requests.
On balance, the new Textualism and Formalism might be seen as a
reversal of the trend away from Literalism, but a small one that
provides only slight support for the professional responsibility
Literalism.
III. THE CASE AGAINST LITERALISM
It seems worth trying to set out the best arguments for and against
Literalism. The conclusion that Literalism should be rejected will not
be surprising. But neither the arguments for nor the ones against
Literalism have been clearly articulated. So even if a review of them
produces no novel conclusion, it may add some confidence to the
disposition to reject it.
I focus on situations where the responder knows what information
the asker is seeking, and has no principled objection to providing it
aside from the ambiguity of the question or request. Thus, I am less
interested in situations where we may be sympathetic to the responder
because the asker threatens some substantive right-for example,
where the asker seeks to invade the responder's privacy, or to deprive
her of an economic return on information she has invested resources
in developing, or to force her to incriminate herself. There are
important arguments in such situations in favor of deception, explicit
or implicit.40  Although I occasionally refer to such situations,
especially Clinton's testimony about sex with Lewinsky, I intend to
bracket questions of the defensibility of deception tout court and
consider simply whether a literally true but knowingly deceptive
response should be deemed legitimate where a literally false one
would not be.
A. Core Objections
There are three principal arguments against Literalism-focused
on, respectively, deception, the rule of law, and the adversary system.
39. See Manning, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical
Moralism, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 433 (1999).
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1. Deception
Literalism is a form of deception. From the responder's point of
view, Literalistic deception is distinguishable because the responder is
more passive than the actor in core cases of deception. Nevertheless,
she is not entirely passive; she does speak in a knowingly misleading
way. And from the asker's point of view, the effect is the same as in
the core case. The asker is misled. Thus, the basic moral objections to
deception seem applicable here: It is a failure of both respect and
solidarity.
2. The Rule of Law
Literalism is in tension with rule-of-law values. The rule of law
prescribes that disputes be resolved and social conduct governed in
accordance with duly promulgated legal norms. Such resolution and
governance requires that enforcers have material information
available to them. Literalism threatens this pre-requisite by
permitting the withholding of material information.
The problem arises from dispersal of information. Some people
have material information not available to others that it is not in their
interests to disclose. Literalism puts a high burden on the party
seeking the information to specify her demand. However, precisely
because she does not have the information, she is in an inferior
position to do so. A Contextual rule puts the burden of resolving
ambiguity on the person who is in the best position to do so-the one
who has the information. Thus, a Contextual norm produces more
material information, and this serves the rule of law.
The rule-of-law value bears on transactional as well as litigation
practice. The rule of law is designed to protect autonomy, and the
fullest exercise of autonomy within legally prescribed boundaries
requires that transacting parties have the information that is material
to them.
A related point can be made in efficiency terms. Access to material
information generally makes for better adjudicative and transactional
decisions. Assigning the duty to clarify ambiguity to the party with
the most information is a lower-cost way of making material
information available to enforcers and transactors.
3. The Adversary System
The third argument asserts that the Contextual understanding is
most compatible with the desirable features of the adversary system as
we practice it.
Some use the adversary system as a trump that favors any position
that puts client loyalty above nonclient interests. But if we look for
connotations that are both well-established in our system and
2002] 1893
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
distinguish it from other systems (notably those of the civil law
countries), we find that the adversary system stands primarily for the
principle of party autonomy. Under this principle, basic responsibility
for defining issues and presenting evidence belongs to the parties and
their counsel, rather than to public officials. One virtue claimed for
this approach is that it increases the chance that the adjudicator will
give fair consideration to all relevant points of view. The presence of
competing advocates asserting their perspectives throughout the
proceeding prevents the adjudicator from allowing preconceptions
developed early on from dulling her sensitivity to inconsistent
evidence. Another virtue is that parties are more likely to regard as
legitimate a decision that follows consideration of the arguments and
evidence they have chosen to present.4'
So viewed, the virtues of the adversary system depend on shared
party control over the presentation of evidence to the trier. They do
not depend at all on a party's unilateral control over the other's access
to evidence. Quite the contrary. Meaningful control over
presentation requires that each counsel have full access to the
evidence that she might find relevant. Neither full consideration of
points of view nor legitimacy can be achieved unless each party has
had and believes that she has had full access. This suggests both that
discovery rights should be broad and that such rights should be
interpreted in the perspective of the asker. The responder is not in a
position to make an objective judgment about materiality, but even if
she were, such a judgment is beside the point. The key thing is that
each party have an opportunity to present the evidence that she
regards as probative. No doubt safeguards against unreasonable and
bad faith demands are needed. But Literalism goes much farther. It
justifies the responder in disregarding the asker's intentions whenever
there is ambiguity in her request. This is contrary to the spirit of party
autonomy, and thus, the adversary system.
B. Responses and Rebuttals
Here is how Literalism responds to the three criticisms and why the
responses are unconvincing:
1. Deception
Literalists often assert that the asker is "responsible" for his own
deception where the statement is literally true.42 Sometimes they add
41. See Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 160-64 (1986)
(emphasizing legitimacy benefits); Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in Talks on
American Law 30 (Harold Berman ed., 1961) (emphasizing cognitive benefits of party
autonomy).
42. See, e.g., Green, supra note 22, at 5-8; cf Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics
226 (Peter Heath trans., 1997) ("[I]f I pack my bags, for example, people will think I
1894 [Vol. 70
2002] SOFT DECEPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
that the asker could have asked a clearer question or followed-up.
This distinguishes the express deception case only by degree, since
there are always some measures that the asker can take to verify any
statement. The measures may be less costly on average with implicit
deception, but the question remains why the asker should be expected
to undertake any more effort than necessary to communicate her
intention.
Perhaps the Literalists believe that the asker should suffer for
disrespecting some social convention about reasonable inferences. If
someone relied on a plainly unreasonable interpretation of a
statement I made, convention might accept my failure to correct it.
(For example, she inferred from my saying I was from Texas that I
was wealthy and lent me money in reliance.) But there does not seem
to be any categorical social convention against reliance on Contextual
interpretation. On the contrary, the norms exemplified by the
Restatements clearly assume that mistaken interpretation of literally
true statements is often reasonable.
A better argument is that implicit deception is less blameworthy
than explicit deception because the deceiver is less active and because
the victim's sense of betrayal will be weaker. The claim rests on the
omission/commission distinction that, though sometimes hard to
justify in principle, has strong support in intuition and convention.
But conceding the premise that explicit deception is worse does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that implicit deception is acceptable.
The Contextualist can still contend that implicit deception is bad
enough to warrant prohibition, and we've seen that, at least in the civil
sphere, there is ample support in substantive law for this notion.
If we ask why implicit deception seems less bad, the answer is likely
to be that it is closer to the situation where the subject is entirely
silent. Here the subject is simply a bystander who knows that another
suffers from a misunderstanding. Yet, even in this situation, many
would argue that there ought to be a "duty to rescue" if the subject
can spare the other major loss without incurring substantial cost
herself.
The "duty to rescue" is strongest where aid is costless to the subject.
In our situation, there is a cost-the information damages the
responder's position in the litigation or negotiation. If the responder
can point to some defect in the process that will be exacerbated by
disclosure, this might be a morally relevant cost. But if we concede
that disclosure generally enhances the likelihood of a fair resolution
(for reasons adduced in the rule-of-law and adversary system
arguments), then the cost seems morally irrelevant. Increased
am off on a journey, and that is what I want them to believe; but they have no right to
demand any declaration of will from me.").
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vulnerability to a disadvantageous but fair decision should not count
against disclosure.
Whatever we conclude about the duty to rescue in the bystander
situation, that situation seems remote from ours. The responder has
usually placed himself in a relation with the asker in which he is
actively seeking some advantage. He is himself seeking information
from the asker, as well as making demands on or proposals to him. In
the transactional context, he is bargaining for a relation with or
benefit from the asker. In litigation, the plaintiff has initiated the
proceeding by making allegations. The defendant may be an
involuntary participant in some respects (although the case may arise
out of his past voluntary conduct), but once the case is initiated, he
does not remain a bystander; he takes positions on the merits and
makes allegations of his own.
2. Rule of Law
There are two Literalist responses worth considering here. One
asserts that Contextualism will undermine accurate determinations by
deterring adequate preparation. Another asserts that it unfairly
subjects the responder to uncertainty regarding his duties in particular
situations.
The argument about preparation asserts that the stronger the duties
to turn over adverse information, the less effort lawyers will spend
preparing their own clients' cases. They will become lazy about
preparation and will overestimate the degree of help they can expect
from their adversaries and miss important evidence. Overall,
preparation will be suboptimal, and adjudication will be less reliable.
This is unconvincing. To begin with, only a lawyer could conflate
less lawyering with less efficiency. Less lawyering can mean more
efficiency. Surely, it means more efficiency to the extent that less
lawyering takes the form of less duplication of effort, more allocation
of discovery burdens to parties with easiest access to evidence, and
less effort spent anticipating and responding to opportunism and
recalcitrance on the part of opposing parties.
The Clinton deposition is a good example. The Jones lawyers
assumed that they might be operating under a Literalism standard or
that Clinton's lawyers would assume that. So they spent a lot of time
drafting an elaborate definition of "sexual relations." According to
Clinton, however, they didn't spend enough time; they failed to
anticipate and eliminate all the ambiguities.
Indeed, Clinton's response raises the question whether it is
sometimes impossible to satisfy a Literalist standard.43 Many who
43. After reviewing the Fisons defendants' literalistic evasions, the Washington
Supreme Court concluded, "[ilt appears clear that no conceivable discovery request
could have been made... that would have uncovered the relevant document[]."
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have parsed the Jones lawyers' definition say that it really did
preclude the ambiguity about whether fellatio was "sex" that Clinton
appealed to.' But Clinton also suggested that he simply didn't
understand the definition. And of course, the more elaborate and
complicated the question gets, the more plausibly the witness can
claim not to understand it.
On the other hand, if they could have anticipated that Clinton's
duty to answer would be defined contextually, the Jones lawyers could
have saved themselves all the effort that went into framing the
question and simply asked about "sexual relations" without
elaboration. In context, no one would have doubted that they
intended to cover oral sex (the focus of Jones's own allegations). The
elimination of this kind of defensive lawyering under a Contextual
regime would be a clear efficiency gain.
Of course, a reduction in lawyering is a clear efficiency gain only if
there is no reduction in the amount and quality of information
generated. In fact, we might expect an increase in information under a
Contextual standard from the lessened ability to take advantage of
ambiguity to withhold adverse material. Clinton's prevarication might
never have been discovered but for Linda Tripp's enterprising tape
recording, and the Fisons "smoking gun" came forth only by the grace
of a whistleblower. Neither contingency seems especially common.
People will be tempted to withhold adverse information if they think
they can get away with it regardless of the rules. However, if there is
either voluntary compliance or a credible sanction threat (and surely
there is), one might expect a Contextual standard to produce more
information because it makes it easier to demand it.
Nevertheless, lawyers who dislike strong disclosure duties argue
that there will be a reduction in the amount and quality produced
because lawyers, once they become accustomed to relying on their
adversaries to make their cases, will become lazy and naYve and fail to
make adequate efforts on their own. The argument does not make
much sense, however. If disclosure duties under a Contextual
standard are perfectly enforced, then it will be both rational and
socially desirable for lawyers to reduce their efforts. To the extent
that they are not enforced, lawyers will be aware of that fact and will
make more effort than in a world of perfect enforcement, though still
probably less than in a Literalist world. Under any set of disclosure
rules, lawyers will have to make judgments about the optimal level of
effort to spend on preparation. There is no reason to think that these
judgments will be less sound under less burdensome discovery
procedures.
Wash. St. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1083 (Wash.
1993).
44. See Starr Report, supra note 24, at 1, 131-50. I find the Independent Counsel
convincing on this point.
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The other Literalist response to rule-of-law concerns claims that
Contextualism subjects the responder to too much uncertainty about
his responsibilities, and hence, liability. The Supreme Court rested its
Literalist interpretation of the perjury statute on this consideration in
Bronston:
To [reject Literalism] would be to inject a new and confusing
element into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses
would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the
misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners ....
Even in the context of a criminal perjury prosecution the point is
debatable. There may be more uncertainty in general about what
compliance requires under a Contextual than under a Literalist
standard, but requirements under a Contextual standard would often
be clear enough. Some cases are ambiguous only in the sense that it is
not clear that the responder is obliged to interpret the request
contextually. Once we know that a Contextual standard applies, cases
like the three with which we began are easy. Under any standard, a
criminal conviction for perjury would require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowingly misled the court.
Where this requirement is not satisfied, the court should reverse for
insufficient evidence. Where it is satisfied, an additional requirement
of Literalism does not seem to add anything of value.
More importantly, whatever plausbility the argument has in the
perjury context depends on the asymmetry of stakes peculiar to
criminal prosecution. We deem erroneous conviction far more costly
than erroneous acquittal. But there is no comparable asymmetry in
the civil sphere. There it is a fatal objection that whatever certainty
Literalism adds for the responder must come at the expense of greater
uncertainty for the asker. The diminished risk of mistaken sanction
for the responder requires an increased risk of loss of material
information, and hence mistaken determination on the merits, for the
asker.
C. The Adversary System
Literalism may derive some support from ideas about the adversary
system such as those expressed by Justice Scalia in his critique of the
1993 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendments requiring
production without demand of adverse information:
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably within the
American judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to
develop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. By placing upon
lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to their
clients-on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines
45. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S 352, at 359 (1973).
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between what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are
not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment- the new
Rule would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to
represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side.!6
We must overlook the hyperbole here. If a duty is inconsistent with
the adversary system simply because it benefits the opposing side,
then we have never had an adversary system. Even before modem
discovery, lawyers had duties, such as the prohibition on lying and
presenting false evidence, designed to benefit opposing parties. Of
course, the modem discovery rules, which govern what has come to be
the principal litigation activity in our system, consists entirely of duties
intended to benefit opposing parties.
However, Justice Scalia's remarks seem to suggest, in addition to
the certainty point we dismissed above, two further specific
arguments:
(1) Judgments under a Contextual standard are especially difficult
because they require the lawyer to take the opposing party's point of
view. I suggested above that the adversary system encourages this in
discovery by prescribing that each party have access to the evidence
he believes is relevant.' But clearly it also contemplates that the
lawyer take his own client's point of view in preparing and presenting
the case at trial. Thus, it requires the lawyer to shift back and forth
between opposing points of view. Scalia suggests that lawyers would
have difficulty doing this and that the adversary system implies that
client loyalty prevails.
This argument, however, misunderstands lawyering as it is practiced
even under an ethic of strong client loyalty. As Anthony Kronman
recently emphasized, the traditional self-image of the profession has
emphasized, not just identification with, but also detachment from
clients. 8 Not client loyalty alone, but this simultaneous sympathy and
detachment constitutes the distinctive trait of effective lawyering. The
lawyer seeks to benefit the client by inducing trust and reliance in
others. The lawyer could not perform this role if she were not able to
understand the perspective of public officials and adverse parties. The
"cardinal rule" in John W. Davis's famous article on advocacy is, not,
Identify with the Client!, but, "Change places (in your imagination of
course) with the Court. ' 49 Roger Fisher and William Ury insist, "the
46. 53 CCH S. Ct. Bull. B2094, B2098 (Apr. 22, 1993) (emphasis added).
47. See supra section III.A.3.
48. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (1993).
49. John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896 (1940); see
also Robert E. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods 6 (2d ed. 1973) ("To be an effective
trial lawyer you must maintain perspective .... In each instance, let your decision on
whether to make a certain point... be guided ... by your appraisal of the effect that
your making the point may have upon the jury's and judge's consideration of all other
aspects of the case.").
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ability to see the situation as the other side sees it... is one of the
most important skills a negotiator can possess."50
(2) It is demoralizing to force lawyers to take actions that benefit
interests adverse to their clients, and it is especially demoralizing to
require them to exercise their professional skills in some challenging
way for the benefit of nonclients.
Stress and demoralization are costs worth taking account of, but we
do not usually regard them as sufficient objections to a social practice
that produces substantial benefits. No doubt police officers find it
stressful to give Miranda warnings or to cease interrogations when a
suspect asks for a lawyer, but no one would think this a sufficient
reason to eliminate these duties.
Moreover, the benefits of disclosure compliance may have a
compensating tendency to enhance morale. The more confident we
are that the case has been determined on the basis of all relevant
information, the more reason we have to think that justice has been
done. The lawyer who wins after disclosing adverse information
should take that much more satisfaction in his work. The lawyer who
loses should have the consolation that the result was more likely a just
one. The lawyer who wins knowing that material adverse information
has been withheld should feel stress from the knowledge that he may
have participated in an injustice.
No doubt lawyers experience more stress from having to disclose
information damaging to their clients than they do from having to
conceal such information even when it is material. And perhaps this
asymmetry is inevitable. But there is nothing desirable about such
feelings and no reason to encourage them.
D. Lawyering is Not a Game
The last refuge of arguments for overly-aggressive lawyering is the
claim that lawyering is a game and that deception and concealment
are part of the rules. Deceptive lawyering is, like bluffing in poker,
permissible because everyone expects and accepts it. It is fair because
the opportunities to deceive and conceal are available to everyone.
And both historically and semantically, the adversary system has
always connoted a role for strategic cleverness, even at the cost of
obfuscation.
It is undeniable that game rhetoric and attitudes have always
appealed to some lawyers. It is easy to see why. The game
perspective puts the lawyers' technical skills at the center of the
picture and makes them an end in themselves. It is natural for lawyers
to take satisfaction in the products of their own cleverness. This view,
50. Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In 23-24 (1981).
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however, has had little appeal to laypeople. Moreover, it is
indefensible as an ethical basis for practical decision-making.
The game perspective is hard to criticize because it is rarely
articulated reflectively, but we can note two important features of
games that make them an inappropriate analogy to the legal process.
First, people usually play games voluntarily and for fun. By
contrast, people have to enter the legal process to pursue and preserve
basic social and economic goods. The fact that the rules are known
and equally applied may be a sufficient guarantee of fairness where
the costs of not playing are trivial, but where the stakes and pressures
to play are high, more is required.
Second, the only measure of fairness in a game is procedural. But
the legal process exists in substantial measure to vindicate the
substantive law, and substantive legal norms provide an independent
measure of the fairness of its results. A lawyering practice that
impedes decision on the substantive merits cannot be just simply
because everyone knows about it or has an opportunity to engage in
it.
CONCLUSION
If the arguments for Literalism are so bad, how do we account for
the bar's stubborn attachment to it? No doubt a sincere but mistaken
belief in the arguments rejected here is part of the explanation. No
doubt the natural psychological disposition of client loyalty also
figures strongly. But we should note that there is a further, less
flattering explanation. Literalism has at least a modest correlation
with the economic self-interest of the bar. It is consistent with the
bar's perceived material interest in minimizing the lawyer's
responsibilities to people who do not pay for the lawyer's services.
Moreover, it seems to have some tendency to enlarge demand for
legal services. Under a Literalist regime, more lawyering is needed to
produce any given amount of information. While this is the opposite
of efficiency from a social point of view, it makes good economic
sense for lawyers.
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